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Abstract 
 
In  order  to  meet  the  Kyoto  targets,  in  the  Netherlands  in  2010  9%  of  electricity 
consumption should be generated from renewable resources. In this paper, we discuss 
and comment on the green energy policy that the Dutch government has adopted in 
2001 and 2002 in order to reach this goal, and the new subsidy system that will be in 
place as of 2003. On the one hand, the policies from the past were successful since 
they  led  to  10%  of  electricity  consumption  being  green  in  2001,  with  a  further 
increase to 13% in 2002. On the other hand, the government argued that the policy 
was  too costly and  inefficient. We analyze whether  the arguments that the Dutch 
government used to get the new law accepted hold water and we show that mainly the 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
  In order to protect the environment, also in the long run, the Kyoto agreement 
specifies  targets  for  efficient  and  environmentally  friendly  production  and 
consumption  of  energy.  One  may  distinguish  between  efforts  in  four  different 
domains. On the input side, there is the desire to move from fossil fuels to renewable 
energy sources; on the production side, one wants to stimulate efficient technologies; 
on  the  consumption  side,  one  wants  to  induce  consumers  to  save  on  energy  use; 
finally,  to prevent  global warming, one wants to limit  CO2-emissions. This paper 
focuses on the first domain and on the electricity market in particular. EU directive 
2001/77/EG (European Commission, 2001) has translated the Kyoto goals in certain 
target levels for EU-countries for green electricity consumption (i.e. consumption of 
electricity that is produced from renewable sources, such as wind, water and the solar 
system, as opposed to ‘conventional’ gray electricity). For the Netherlands, the target 
is that in 2010 9% of consumption is green. In this paper, we discuss and comment on 
the green energy policy that the Dutch government has adopted until the end of 2002 
in order to reach this goal, and the proposed changes to this policy. 
 
  The Dutch experience is interesting since, during 2001 and 2002, the Dutch 
experimented with a policy mix that differed from that in the rest of the European 
Union. While most other European countries have relied on “command and control” 
systems,  during  2001  and  2002  the  Netherlands  adopted  a  purely  market  based 
voluntary  system.  One  may  distinguish  between  supply-side  and  demand-side 
policies.  Most  European  countries  (Austria,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) maintain fixed feed-in tariffs for green 
electricity: for any electricity produced from renewable sources that is fed into their 
network, network companies are forced to pay green generators relatively high prices 
that  are  determined  by  the  government.  These  feed-in  tariffs  may  differentiate 
according to the generating source, and various ways of distributing the costs of this 
obligation among the users of the network may be distinguished. Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK adopt demand-side policies, in which an obligation is 
imposed that a certain fraction of demand be supplied from renewable sources. (See 
Krause (2002) for further details.) 
   4 
  The Dutch green electricity market was liberalized on July 1, 2001, when all 
consumers got the right to freely choose their green electricity supplier. For the first 
one and a half-years, policy mainly relied on demand-side subsidies: consumers did 
not have to pay the regulatory energy tax (REB), amounting to 6  ¼FHQWVN:K IRU
small  users,  when  they  consumed  green  electricity.  With  a  total  energy  price, 
including distribution charges and taxes amounting to some 20  ¼FHQWVN:K WKHVH
subsidies can be said to be quite generous. In addition to these consumer subsidies, 
there  were  also  some  direct  producer  subsidies.  During  2001,  green  electricity 
produced  abroad  was  not  eligible  for  the  demand  side  subsidies,  but  distribution 
companies lobbied for including imports, arguing that domestic production capacity 
was insufficient to meet demand. This lobby was successful, and, as of January 1, 
2002 also imports of green energy became eligible for this subsidy. As a result of the 
demand-side  subsidy,  green  electricity  demand  has  soared,  with  the  number  of 
households that demand green energy reaching 1.4 million by the end of 2002. This is 
some 20% percent of all households, and compares to less than 1% green consumers 
in Germany and the US. For details see www.greenprices.com, where one can also 
compare  prices  of  different  supply  companies.  (The  site  reports  that,  in  the  first 
quarter of 2003, another 400,000 Dutch consumers have switched to green energy, so 
that, at present no less than 26% of Dutch households are consuming green energy.)  
 
  As a matter of fact, in a certain sense, the Dutch green electricity policy was 
too successful and, at the end of 2002, a new law was proposed to bring policy more 
in line with that in other European countries; see Tweede Kamer (2002-2003a). The 
intention was to have the new policy in place at the start of 2003, but, as the first 
Balkenende cabinet fell after having been in office for only a couple of months, plans 
were delayed. Recently, also the First Chamber of Parliament has approved the new 
law, and it will come into effect as of the 1
st of July 2003. According to this new law, 
the consumption subsidies are reduced, and the producer subsidies are increased but 
are  limited  to domestic production.  The  main arguments given for  this change in 
policy are that: 
(i)  Some forms of renewable electricity production have received higher subsidies 
than are needed to make them competitive with gray electricity, 
(ii)  A great part of Dutch electricity consumption has been produced abroad by 
already  existing  generating  units  that  are  competitive  without  receiving   5 
additional subsidies, hence, these units make handsome profits, at the expense 
of Dutch taxpayers, 
(iii)  The  subsidies  have  not  led  to  increased  capacity  for  the  production  of 
renewable electricity abroad, 
(iv)  The competition from foreign green energy has eroded the incentives to invest 
in renewable electricity generation capacity within the Netherlands. 
 
  In the motivation for the change in policy (Tweede Kamer 2002-2003b), the 
Dutch government argues that the Netherlands can be sure to meet the 9% target for 
green electricity consumption in 2010 only if a substantial part of this 9% is produced 
domestically. The reason, so it is argued, is that also the other European countries 
have similar targets, hence, the generation capacity that is used now can no longer be 
relied on in the future. Of course, this argument cannot be accepted at face value: one 
can guarantee supply by concluding long-term contracts. Furthermore, even if there 
would  be  some  truth  in  the  argument,  it  does  not  justify  restricting  subsidies  to 
domestic renewable production. If it would be cost efficient to produce renewable 
electricity abroad, one would want to subsidize dedicated production capacity abroad 
and ensure that that production can reach the Netherlands by guaranteeing access to 
European transport networks.  Indeed, the EU Energy Directives aim at creating a 
single European electricity market by strengthening the European transport networks 
and by guaranteeing non-discriminatory access to these networks. In other words, the 
worries  about  “security  of  supply”  should  be  addressed  first  and  foremost  at  the 
European level, by insisting on market liberalization, rather than by adopting second 
best  measures  such  as  subsidizing  domestic  production.  (This  argument  was  also 
discussed in the First Chamber of Parliament; see Eerste Kamer (2002-2003, page 5.)) 
 
  While  one  could,  hence,  criticize  the  proposals  (Van  Damme  and  Zwart, 
2002),  our  emphasis  in  this  paper  will  not  be  on  the  new  law,  but  rather  on  the 
situation that prevailed in 2001 and 2002. Our aim is to describe and analyze the 
workings  of  that  system,  in  order  to  see  whether  the  arguments  that  the  Dutch 
government used to get the new law accepted hold water. The Dutch cabinet argued 
that, in the existing system, a considerable part of Dutch environmental  subsidies 
were leaking abroad, but it did not provide an estimate of the amounts involved. Our 
analysis will allow us to give a reasonable estimate: we will show that approximately   6 
one third of the total subsidy ended up abroad, the rest remaining in the Netherlands. 
As  one  may  expect,  those  who  lobbied  to  extend  the  subsidies  to  the  foreign 
producers, i.e. the local distribution companies, were the main beneficiaries of the act. 
 
  The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  gives 
background information on the relevant subsidy schemes and on the green certificate 
system. Section 3 gives prices of green certificates and interconnector capacity and 
shows  that  the  latter  do  not  reflect  arbitrage  between  the  German  and  the  Dutch 
markets.  Section  4  provides  analysis,  explains  this  “anomaly”  and  answers  the 






  As stated above, the Dutch policy goal with respect to green electricity is that, 
in 2010, 9% of electricity consumption is produced from renewable sources. Present 
consumption  in  the  Netherlands  is  about  107  TWh  per  year,
1  which  amounts  to 
average  demand  of  about  12,200  MWh  per  hour.  On  the  production  side,  it  is 
customary to distinguish between generation, transmission, distribution and supply of 
electricity. 
 
  Domestic installed generation capacity is about 21,000 MW, of which some 
14,000 MW is owned by four large generating companies (Electrabel, E.On, Essent, 
and Reliant). These larger generating units are directly connected to the high voltage 
grid.  System  operator  TenneT,  a  state  owned  company  that  is  responsible  for 
balancing the system, manages the electrical transmission system: at any time total 
electricity production should be matched with demand (i.e. electricity is not storable). 
Supply companies (such as Nuon, Essent and Eneco) are the intermediaries between 
producers and end consumers. Currently larger consumers are free to choose their 
supply company. The same is true for small end users consuming green electricity. 
Market opening for all consumers is planned to take place in July 2004. Until that 
                                                 
1 1 TWh = 10
12 Wh = 10
9 kWh = 10
6 MWh = 10
3 GWh = 3.6 10
15 J.   7 
time,  supply  of  gray  power  to  the  captive  consumers  remains  a  regulated  (local) 
monopoly. Physical delivery requires use of the local, low-voltage, distribution grids, 
which  are  (and  remain)  regulated  natural  monopolies.  Total  end-user  charges  are 
composed out of the commodity price, grid charges, fees for supply companies and 
taxes. 
  
  TenneT’s high voltage grid is connected to the grids of E.On-Netz and RWE-
Netz in Germany and to that of Elia in Belgium. In total, the interconnectors with 
these  neighboring  countries  have  a  capacity  of  3,650  MW  to  import  or  export 
electricity. Use of this scarce capacity is allocated via auctions, organized by TSO-
auction, a daughter of TenneT and the foreign grid owners. We will discuss these 
auctions in more detail later. 
 
  In both Germany and the Netherlands, wholesale (gray) energy is traded on 
exchanges,  the  EEX  in  Germany  and  the  APX  in  the  Netherlands.  Prices  for 
wholesale (gray) energy in Germany are typically lower than Dutch prices. In 2002 
average  German  prices  ranged  around  ¼ 0:K ZKLOH SULFHV IRU SRZHU LQ WKH
Netherlands were somewhat over  ¼ 0:K RQ DYHUDJH
2. The price  difference  is 
mainly due to differences in electricity production technologies (with low marginal 
cost  nuclear  and  coal  production  in  Germany,  and  gas-fired  power  plants  in  the 
Netherlands). As a consequence, demand for import capacity over the German-Dutch 
interconnection is high, and frequently congestion occurs on these lines, translating in 
non-zero auction prices for capacity. Congestion on the Belgian-Dutch border is much 
less frequent.  
 
  Statistics Netherlands has recently published data about renewable electricity 
production in the Netherlands; see CBS (2002) and CBS (2003), and see Table 1 for a 
summary. In 2002, total domestic production of green electricity was 3.627 TWh, up 
from 2.936 TWh in 2001. Most of this green electricity (2.576 TWh) was produced 
                                                 
2 These wholesale prices are only a small component of retail prices for end users: costs of distribution 
via the grid, costs of supply companies and taxes lead to a final electricity bill of over ¼0:KRU¼
0.20/kWh for household consumers.  For one of the authors, in May 2003, the gray price is composed 
as follows: Network charges: ¼SHUPRQWKDQG¼N:KVXSSO\¼SHUPRQWKDQG¼
0.046/kWh, REB: ¼N:KDQG9$7RYHUWKHVXPRIWKHSUHYLRXVWKUHHLWems. For green 
electricity, the network charge and VAT are the same, supply is ¼SHUPRQWKDQG¼N:KDQG
REB is correspondingly lower so that the end price is about the same.   8 
from biomass, just as in 2001 (approximately 2 TWh). Windmills produced 0.910 
TWh of electricity, 10% more than in 2001, when production was a bit less than in 
2000,  mainly  as  a  result  of  the  absence  of  wind.  During  2001,  the  number  of 
windmills increased by 34 to 1330, while in 2002 there was a further increase with 
132 units. As a result of this additional investment, the total capacity of the Dutch 
windmill  park  increased  by  40%  in  2002.  The  small  remainder  of  renewable 
production is mainly hydropower; the production of solar energy is marginal.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
  Given that production of green energy is subsidized, it is natural to assume 
that domestic capacity is not much higher than domestic production, and it follows 
that current domestic capacity is insufficient to meet the Kyoto-target; hence, green 
imports seem needed. Statistics Netherlands reports that, in 2001, green electricity 
imports were with 7.6 TWh rather large and much higher than in 2000, when they 
were only 1.5 TWh. Interestingly, in 2002, green imports were even larger and had 
increased  to  10.35  TWh.  These  estimates  are  based  on  firms’  filings  for  ecotax 
reduction,  hence they are reliable; see Ecofys  (2002) and  Kroon  (2002) for more 
details on the data for 2001. Note that if we add domestic and foreign generation, we 
come to a total of 10.6 TWh of green electricity that was produced for the Dutch 
market in 2001, and to a total of 14 TWh in 2002. Consequently, since generation 
equals  consumption,  already  in  the  year  2001,  about  10%  of  Dutch  electricity 
consumption was green, while in 2002 even 13% of consumption was green. In other 
words, the Netherlands already met the Kyoto target nine years before the deadline! It 
should be noted also that, in 2001, “official” green consumption was only 1.57 TWh, 
while in 2002, the estimate is about 3.5 TWh, and hence, most of the green energy is 
sold as being “gray”.  
 
  The above makes one wonder about which instruments were responsible for 
this success. A distinction has to be made between supply-side subsidies, which were 
in place throughout 2001, and demand-side subsidies that were available as of the date 
when the Dutch market for green electricity was liberalized, July 1, 2001. Although 
we are mainly interested in the demand-side, we describe the supply-side subsidies 
first.   9 
 
  On the basis of article 36o of the “Wet Belastingen op Milieugrondslag” (law 
on  environmental  taxes,  available  as  Schuurmans  &  Jordens,  2000)  during  2001, 
generators of green electricity could get a subsidy of  ¼ 0:K IRU HDFK 0:K RI
green  electricity  that  was  produced  and  consumed  in  the  Netherlands.  Note  that, 
compared to the average commodity price for electricity traded on the APX in 2001, 
of ¼0:KWKHVL]HRIWKHVXEVLG\LVFRQVLGHUDEOHRIFRXUVHFRPSDUHGWRWKHWRWDO
end user retail prices for domestic consumers of over ¼0:KWKHLPSDFWVHHms 
smaller.  This  subsidy  was  available  for  domestic  producers,  but,  under  certain 
conditions, also for foreign producers. In essence, the latter had to provide sufficient 
proof that they did not receive other types of subsidies for their electricity and that 
they transported the electricity to the Netherlands, so that it was consumed there. As 
evidence, the exporters had to demonstrate their E-programs to the relevant Dutch tax 
authority, hence, one had to show the contract path for the electricity and one had to 
buy the transport capacity that was needed to carry out this E-program. We note that 
small-scale  (<  15  MW)  hydropower  was  eligible  for  this  subsidy,  but  that  larger 
hydropower production units were assumed to be competitive without subsidies and, 
hence, were excluded from the subsidies. Kroon (2002) notes that these subsidies are 
also very attractive for small-scale hydro installations and he estimates that in Europe 
some 2400 MW of capacity may be ready to export to the Netherlands. 
  
  The market for green energy was fully liberalized as of July 1, 2001, i.e. at that 
time all consumers got free choice of supply-company for their green energy. On that 
same  day,  the  demand-side  subsidies  (under  article  36i  of  the  same  law  on 
environmental  taxes)  came  into  effect  and  the  system  of  green  certificates  was 
introduced; see Staatscourant (2001a). A domestic generator of green electricity (i.e. a 
producer  who  produces electricity  from wind, biomass, water or the sun),  who  is 
recognized as such by the relevant authority, and whose production is measured by 
the network company that connects him to the grid, receives a green certificate for 
each MWh of electricity that he produces. These green certificates state the source of 
production, but they can be traded between market participants independently of the 
electricity. A subsidiary of TenneT, Groencertificatenbeheer BV, (abbreviated GCB) 
facilitates the trading of these certificates, which are valid for a year. Eventually, the 
supply  companies  that  supply  electricity  to  end-users  will  buy  these  certificates.   10 
Under the 2001 regime, consumers who bought green electricity did not have to pay 
the regulatory energy tax (REB). If a supply company supplied X MWh of electricity 
to  a  consumer  who  had  a  green  contract,  and  the  supply  company  had  X  green 
certificates, then the tax authority reimbursed the supply company the REB for this 
consumer. The REB rates that applied in 2002 are given in Table 2; in 2001, these 
rates were not much different.   
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
  As the REB is a regressive tax, it follows that buying green electricity is most 
attractive for small-scale consumers, hence, supply companies will first target those. 
An average household consumes about 3.2 MWh of electricity per year and there are 
about  7  million  households  in  the  Netherlands,  hence  total  electricity  demand  of 
small-scale consumers is 22.4 TWh, a bit more than 20% of total electricity demand, 
and much above domestic green electricity production.  
 
  In  the  fall  of  2001, following  a  lobby  by  the  distribution companies, who 
argued that (potential) demand for green electricity outstripped domestic generation 
capacity, the “Regeling groencertificaten” was modified, and also imported electricity 
became eligible for the consumer subsidy; see Staatscourant (2001b). As with the 
producer subsidies, it had to be proved that the electricity was physically imported 
into the Netherlands, hence, at the interconnectors transport capacity had to be bought 
for  that  purpose.  (The  Regulation  states  this  somewhat  vaguely:  one  should  have 
enough capacity to import, but one did not necessarily need to have the capacity at the 
point in time when the imports took place.) The other elements of the subsidy scheme 
remained in place, with the exception that hydropower was no longer eligible for 
REB-reduction. Most probably, this change was made  mainly in order to exclude 
imported hydropower from these attractive subsidies. The amendment took effect as 
of January 1, 2002; hence, as of that moment GCB also issued certificates for green 
electricity produced abroad. In the remainder of this paper we will investigate the 
consequences of this policy change. 
 
  Of course, an immediate consequence of opening up the Dutch market for 
foreign producers was that the supply of green certificates increased, which one would   11 
expect to result in a price reduction. At the same time, however, supply companies 
stepped up their advertising campaigns, in order to attract additional demand for green 
energy.  Indeed,  one  might  expect  there  to  be  latent  demand:  as  information  on 
www.greenprices.com shows, the majority of Dutch consumers prefers to consume 
green energy if that has the same price as gray energy, while a considerable minority 
(45% in 2000) is even willing to pay a premium for green electricity. 
 
  A  second consequence of the opening up of  the  certificate market was an 
increased demand for interconnector capacity. After all, a foreign producer could only 
get a Dutch green certificate if he also had bought interconnector capacity. Here, since 
the available capacity is scarce, one would expect an increase of its price. As we will 
see in the next section, the auction results indeed show an increase in auction prices. 
 




  At the site of GCB (www.groencertificatenbeheer.nl) one can see how many 
green certificates have been issued. We will concentrate on the totals for the year 
2002, which are provided in Table 3. In the table, we distinguish between certificates 
from a Dutch source (labeled by ‘H’) and certificates originating abroad (labeled by 
‘A’). Since there was a significant distinction between green imports in the first and 
second  half  of  the  year  (imports  increased  during  the  year  and  stabilized  from 
September onwards), we also provide the December 2002 data for reference.    
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 shows that, during 2002, certificates were issued for about 10.5 TWh 
of electricity. We also see that about 78% of green electricity consumption originates 
abroad and that the production of solar energy is, with 0.01% of the total, negligible. 
The most important source is biomass, with 54% of the total; hydropower comes next 
with  almost  37%  of  the  total.  The  production  of  wind  energy  (9%)  is  relatively 
modest.   12 
Note that the data from Table 3 are not entirely consistent with those of Table 
1. There are large discrepancies as far as domestic biomass is concerned, and for these 
we do not have a good explanation, except that, perhaps, the certificates for this power 
were issued only in 2003. In percentage terms, the discrepancy is also large for solar 
energy, but as the total quantity from that source is rather small, this does not bother 
us very much.  In addition, on the basis of Table 3, one would estimate imports as 8.1 
TWh, where according to CBS these were 10.35 TWh, composed as biomass 6.21 
TWh and hydropower 4.14 TWh. Again there are large discrepancies and we can only 
explain the difference for hydropower. Recall that, as of 2002, hydropower is eligible 
for green certificates, but not for the demand side subsidies, hence, as the certificate is 
not necessary to get the subsidy, a producer of hydropower may not bother to claim a 
certificate. Nevertheless, at least two reasons can be mentioned for why certificates 
would be attractive also in this case. First of all, the certificates may be used for 
marketing purposes: some suppliers advertise that they deliver hydropower, which is 
perceived to be “greener” than biomass. Secondly, with a certificate one can claim the 
producer subsidy. Since having a certificate is not necessary for claiming the producer 
subsidy,  however,  one  may  expect  that  not  all  hydropower  imports  have  been 
submitted  to  GCB  and  that  the  data  from  Table  2  underestimate  the  amount  of 
hydropower  that  was  imported.  Consequently,  one  could  explain  the  difference 
between the 3.7 from Table 3 and the 4.14 estimated by CBS by the fact that not all 
producers of hydropower will apply for certificates.  
 
  All power mentioned in Table 3 was eligible for the production subsidy of ¼
20/MWh, however, hydropower was not eligible for the demand-side subsidy. If we 
take hydropower out, we are left with 6.7 TWh of power that can profit from the 
demand-side  subsidies.  At  the  moment,  about  1.4  million  Dutch  households  have 
switched to green power. With an average consumption of 3.2 MWh per household 
per  year,  this  gives  an  annual  green  demand  of  about  4.5  TWh  resulting  from 
households. To this has to be added the green demand from larger users about which 
no data are available. For a sufficiently low green certificate price, (lower than the 
marginal REB rate of ¼0:KLWZRXOGEHDWWUDFWLYHIRUVXSSO\FRPSDQLHVWRDOVR
target medium sized businesses with annual consumption less than 50 MWh. If total 
demand from business consumers would remain below 2.2 TWh, however, we should   13 
expect the price of green certificates to be small, in fact, under competitive conditions, 
if green certificates were not storable, the theoretical price would be zero.  
 
  Unfortunately, the prices at which green certificates are traded are not public. 
Through a broker it was possible to get some information on prices for imported 
biomass certificates, which is reproduced in Table 4. This table gives the price for the 
stripped certificate, i.e. it does not include the producer subsidy. Note that the price 
has gone down, but that it has not yet reached the level of zero. Also note that the 
price since May is less than ¼0:K:HXQGHUVWDQGWKDWFHUWLILFDWHSULFHVIRUHJ
domestically produced wind  electricity have  been  significantly higher,  with prices 
around ¼-50/MWh. Since the bulk of green energy consists of imported biomass, 
however, the average green certificate price will be relatively low.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
   
Interconnection 
 
  We now move on to discuss the interconnector auctions. A trader who has 
acquired power abroad and who wants to export it to the Netherlands, will have to 
acquire interconnector capacity at the border. In total, about 3650 MW of capacity is 
available, out of which 300 MW is reserved for system balancing by TenneT, while 
900 MW is reserved in order to execute long-term import contracts that date back to 
the days of coordinated electricity planning. The remaining capacity, about 2450 MW, 
is auctioned. There are different auctions for different interconnectors and, at each 
interconnector,  year,  month  and  day  auctions  are  distinguished.  Capacity  that  is 
acquired in the year auction can be used throughout the year and capacity acquired in 
the auction for say May 2002 can be used during May 2002. The day auction actually 
consists of 24 hourly auctions, capacity acquired in the “March-17-2002; 2-3 am”-
auction can be used during that hour of that specific day. The year auction takes place 
in November of the preceding year, the month auction takes place in the preceding 
month and the day auction is a day ahead auction. As it is not easy to buy electricity in 
Belgium, having capacity at the interconnectors with Belgium is not very valuable for 
market parties, with the exception of Electrabel, which has production capacity on 
both sides of the border. This is reflected in auction prices that are rather low.    14 
 
We, hence, will focus here on the interconnectors with Germany. There are 
two such interconnectors, one connects the Dutch grid with that of E.On-Netz, the 
other connecting to RWE-Netz. In total, about 1600-1800 MW of capacity is available 
at these interconnectors, of which 572 MW is offered in the year auction, and 536 
MW in the month auctions. Capacity at these interconnectors is valuable as there is a 
liquid power market, the EEX, in Germany, at which prices are on average lower (by 
¼ -10/MWh) than in the Netherlands. Here we will simply look at the aggregate 
capacity at these interconnectors and their average (capacity based) price. The latter is 
justified since the price differences in the year and month auctions are not very large.  
 
  The 1100 MW of capacity that is available, in the year and month auctions, for 
base load capacity is most attractive for traders that are interested to receive Dutch 
subsidies  for  renewable  electricity  that  is  produced  abroad.  Note  that  in  order  to 
import the 8.1 TWh of green electricity from Table 3 one needs to have 930 MW of 
capacity throughout the year, this is more than is available in the year auction only. 
Similarly, in order to import the 1.2 TWh of electricity during December 2002, one 
needs  to  have  some  1350  MW  of  capacity  during  each  hour  of  this  month. 
Furthermore, taking the data from Table 1, we see that in order to import 10.35 TWh 
of power, one needs 1182 MW of hourly capacity on average throughout the year, 
which  is  again  more  than  what  is  available  in  the  year  and  month  auctions. 
Consequently, yearly capacity is scarce and, in some months, capacity in the month 
auctions  is  scarce  as  well.  One  thus  expects  high  prices  in  the  year  and  month 
auctions. 
 
  At  the  website  of  TSO-auction  BV  (www.tso-auction.nl)  price  data  are 
available. Relevant information for the annual auctions is provided in the table below. 
We see that in the year 2002, the price for capacity was much higher than in 2001, and 
also much higher than the price that was paid for capacity that will be available during 
2003. 
   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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  How to explain the rather large price difference? In a market that is working 
efficiently, one would expect the interconnector price to reflect arbitrage possibilities 
between the markets at the two sides of the interconnector. In the absence of green 
electricity, traders can buy gray electricity at the cheap (German) side at price pG and 
sell it at the more expensive Dutch side (for a wholesale price of pN); the profit made 
is the (wholesale) price difference 
 
  v1 = pN - pG                  (1) 
 
between the two markets, and competition at the auction should drive the price up to 
this price difference. Of course, the actual price difference is somewhat uncertain, 
hence, one might expect a small risk premium: the auction price will be somewhat 
less than the expected price difference at the day of the auction. On the other hand, a 
trader is not forced to use the interconnector capacity; capacity bought in the year 
auction can be resold in the month or day auction. This implies that, if one holds 
capacity, one can import if the price difference is favorable and can resell capacity if 
the price difference is unfavorable, in other words, the arbitrage profit is equal to max 
(0, pN - pG) and this would induce a trader to bid more aggressively in the auction. We 
note that, in 2001, the average (over all hours) of pN – pG was ¼0:KZKHUHDV
the average of max(0, pN – pG) was ¼0:KZKHUHpN denotes the APX-price and 
pG the EEX-price. 
 
  As an estimate of the expected price difference, at the time of auction, we may 
use the price difference for annual base load contracts, pN – pG, as reported by Platt’s 
in its European Power Daily (Platt’s, 2001-2002) on the day of the year auction, i.e. 
November 28 of the preceding year. On November 28, 2000, this price difference was 
¼ 0:K RQH \HDU ODWHU LW ZDV ¼ 0:K DQG RQ 1RYHPEHU   LW ZDV ¼
7.35/MWh. One sees that auction prices in 2001 and 2003 are close to these values, 
but in 2002 they are way off. 
 
  We may make similar observations for the month auctions during 2002. The 
following graph gives for the year 2002 the price paid in the month auction (averaged 
over the two interconnectors) and the arbitrage price for monthly base load energy   16 
(based on Platt’s quotes) on the day these auctions took place. We see that also in 
these auctions a substantial premium resulted, in particular at the end of the year. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 2 reports the same data as in Figure 1, but now for the year 2001. Note 
that, at the beginning of the year, the interconnector price was somewhat less than the 
price difference between the two markets, in line with arbitrage. From the middle of 
the year, however, the auction price was somewhat larger than the price difference, 
and this might indicate that hydro imports were starting to congest the interconnector. 
On  the other hand, as the figure  shows,  the  interconnector price did not  reveal a 
significant mark-up on arbitrage values. (To import the 7.6 TWh of power from Table 
1, one needs to have 868 MW of hourly capacity on average, hence, imports appear 
insufficient to congest the interconnector.)  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
We next move on to an attempt to explain the observed prices in terms of an 
equilibrium model for green electricity, and will see that the Dutch subsidies may 
indeed  provide  an  explanation  for  the  seeming  “anomaly”  for  the  year  2002.  Of 
course, our model is stylized, as all models are, and abstracts away from many issues 
such  as  marketing  cost  for  green  energy,  maintenance  cost  for  windmills,  and 
switching costs of consumers, to name but a few. As a result of focusing, we get a 
clearer picture of the costs involved in the subsidy scheme and of who benefited from 
this scheme.  
 
4.  ANALYSIS:  A  MODEL  OF  GREEN  CERTIFICATE  AND 
INTERCONNECTION PRICES 
 
    The prices for green certificates and the mark-up on ‘gray’ arbitrage prices 
implicit  in  interconnection  prices  will  depend  on  a  balance  between  supply  and 
demand  for  green  electricity  produced  both  abroad  and  in  the  Netherlands,  in 
conjunction with the capacity constraints on imports of electricity. We will study this 
balance under the 2001-2002 subsidy regime. We will first focus on the supply side,   17 
next on the demand side, thereafter we will focus on the special role of small-scale 
hydro  energy,  and  finally  we  will  describe  the  equilibrium  and  compare  it  with 





We first analyze the supply side of the problem. We will defer a discussion on 
small-scale  hydro  energy  (‘light  green’),  which  only  benefits  from  the  producer 
subsidy, and first focus on green energy production that is eligible for the demand 
subsidy (‘dark green’).  
 
We  can  divide  potential  suppliers  of  green  certificates  in  four  categories: 
existing domestic green generation, newly constructed domestic generation, and the 
same  categories  for  foreign  generation.  All  these  producers  will  require  a  certain 
minimum green certificate benefit in order to produce for the Dutch green market. 
 
The  category  of  existing  domestic  green  generation  is  simplest.  These 
suppliers will mostly make up the lowest end of the supply curve. For wind and solar 
production, marginal production costs are near zero. Marginal costs for biomass plants 
depend on the type of fuel; in general their fuel costs can be expected to be somewhat 
higher than in the case of conventional generation. Given that all these generators will 
at least earn the price for gray electricity plus the  ¼ 0:K SURGXFHU VXEVLG\ ZH
may expect the majority of these units to produce at low or zero green certificate 
prices. 
 
For the longer-term equilibrium also newly constructed domestic units become 
relevant. These will for a large part make up the higher part of the supply curve, due 
to the large fixed cost component of many sources. (To induce entry of new units, 
revenues should exceed long run average costs, instead of short run marginal costs). 
Computations by KEMA/ECN (ECN 2002) lead to indicative required subsidies of 
some  ¼ -80/MWh to make investment in e.g. wind (on- and off-shore) and pure 
biomass fired plants profitable. Conventional plant adjustments to allow for biomass 
co-firing will be significantly lower, and can also be available on a much shorter time   18 
scale. The volume of potential newly constructed plants will be limited due to scarcity 
of available sites (wind), or available fuel (biomass). 
 
The  third  category  consists  of  foreign  existing  green  units  (subject  to  a 
reciprocity clause limiting eligible countries). Insofar as these units may benefit from 
local feed-in tariffs, their required green certificate price to induce them to deliver to 
the Dutch market instead will be relatively high in general: for example, German wind 
energy could, in 2002, benefit from a minimum feed-in tariff of  ¼ 0:K ZKLOH
small-scale  biomass  (<20  MW)  was  rewarded  at  least  ¼ 0:K LH JLYHQ WKDW
German EEX–prices were approximately ¼0:Kthese producers could receive a 
subsidy of the order of ¼WR0:KLQ*HUPDQ\)RUXQLWVWKDWDUHH[FOXGHGIURP
these generous schemes, such as larger biomass units, the situation is different. A 
good example may be larger German coal or lignite plants that can co-fire biomass 
fuel. Their marginal opportunity costs cG for delivering in Germany would be the 
maximum of their marginal production costs and the German (gray) electricity price 
pG, or  
 
cG = pG + e                  (2) 
 
with e ³ 0 the excess marginal production cost. Michaela Krause informed us that 
there  may  be  another  way  for  producers  to  green  their  electricity.  Rather  than 
adjusting technical production, one may buy a RECS-certificate. RECS is a European 
system of tradable certificates that are recognized in various countries. By combining 
gray energy with a RECS certificate, the energy becomes green; hence, one may buy a 
RECS-certificate  where  it  is  cheap  and  trade  it  for  a  GCB-certificate  in  the 
Netherlands.  We  have  been  told  that,  in  2002,  it  was  possible  to  buy  a  RECS-
certificate for around ¼0:KKHQFHWKLVZRXOGLPSO\e = 4 in (2).   
 
Supplying to the Dutch green market instead entails an additional cost, the 
interconnector charge. The benefits are composed out of the Dutch gray price pN, the 
¼ 0:K SURGXFHU VXEVLG\ DQG WKH SULFH RI JUHHQ FHUWLILFDWHV g.  Splitting  the 
interconnection  price  into  the  (gray)  arbitrage  price  pN  -  pG  and  a  possible 
interconnector mark-up s we arrive at the requirement   19 
 
g ³ s + e – 20                 (3) 
 
for it to be worthwhile to supply to the Netherlands.  
 
Finally,  the  analysis  for  newly  constructed  foreign  capacity  is  a 
straightforward extension of the above.  
 
  Adding things up we can construct a qualitative picture of the (medium term) 
green supply q(g,s) as a function of green certificate price g and interconnector mark-
up s, 
 
q(g,s) = qed(g) + qnd(g) + qef(g,s) + qnf(g,s)            (4) 
 
where the subscript e (resp.n) refers to existing (new) capacity, where d (resp. f) refers 
to domestic (resp. foreign), and where the last two terms explicitly depend on s. 
 
At fixed s the picture following from the above analysis looks like Figure 3. 
For clarity we have assumed s, the interconnector mark-up, large (>20): in this case 
we  can  identify  separately  the  contributions  from  low  marginal  cost  domestic 
production (at g = 0), and low marginal cost foreign production, the plateau at g = s – 
20. For lower s (as appears to be the case in reality, judging from Figure 1) both 
contributions merge. In the graph, in region I we find the domestic installed capacity, 
which  will  contribute,  even  at  very  low  certificate  price.  In  region  II  it  becomes 
profitable  for  foreign  existing  capacity  to  deliver  in  the  Netherlands.  Available 
volume at g = s - 20 is set by low marginal cost production (with e=0), the upward 
sloping part consists of production which is slightly more costly than marginal gray 
prices, i.e. e > 0. Region III is composed of new capacity (as well as high marginal 
cost installed capacity).  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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Demand side 
 
  The total demand for green certificates will also depend, to some extent, on the 
price. There is presumably a large and inelastic demand at any g < 60 consisting of 
supply companies delivering to small consumers who need neither price incentive nor 
large scale advertising to switch to green energy. At decreasing g, green consumers 
will become more and more valuable for retailers, who pocket the difference 60 - g, 
minus a possible discount they may pass on to customers, and, in this case, one may 
expect larger advertising and larger demand for certificates. Since green certificates 
stay valid for one year, expectations of potential growth of green consumption may 
induce a demand for certificates that exceeds consumption at that time. At low g 
(<20)  demand  in  the  category  of  small  and  medium  sized  businesses  will  be 
encouraged, as their marginal REB tariff equals ¼0:K 
 
Hydro energy  
 
Hydro power is not eligible for the consumer subsidy and therefore does not 
affect the green certificate price directly. For foreign hydro energy there is an indirect 
effect, however. Since hydro energy (from smaller units) does receive the ¼/MWh 
producer subsidy, it will be attractive to import this to the Netherlands as long as the 
interconnector mark-up s is smaller than 20 (since marginal costs for hydro power are 
near  zero,  opportunity  costs  are  precisely  the  German  price,  or  e  =  0  for  hydro 
energy). For small enough s, interconnector capacity will be used up partly by hydro 





  The values for g and s will be determined by two equilibrium conditions. In 
the first place, total supply and total demand for non-hydro green energy, d(g), will be 
equal for positive green certificate price (assuming of course that there is sufficient 
available supply in principle): 
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£ + - ³
= + - ×
(g,s) q (g) q d(g) g
      (g,s) q (g) q d(g) g 
            (5) 
 
where we have aggregated contributions from existing and new capacity. 
 
  Second, the interconnector mark-up will depend on whether total foreign green 
production (hydro and other) is lower than available interconnector capacity, K, or 
equals  it.  In  the  former  case,  some  interconnector  capacity  is  still  used  by  gray 
electricity, which implies that s = 0 (s can never be negative, since in this case gray 
imports would completely displace green imports, setting s again to its arbitrage value 
of zero). In the latter case, green imports will set the interconnector price. We can 
here distinguish two cases: if the mark-up s is less than 20, part of the capacity will be 
for the small-scale hydro power which does not benefit from g, while if s is larger 
than  20,  it  will  only  be  profitable  for  non-hydro  green  energy  to  be  imported. 
Denoting the total available foreign small-scale hydropower by H (assuming that H < 
K) we arrive at  
H K g q s
s K e g s
s K-H e g s
- < =
> - + =
£ < - + =
) 0 , ( ; 0
20 ); ( 20
20 0 ); ( 20
f
          (6) 
 
Here e(K) respectively e(K-H) are the excess marginal production costs e (as defined 
above), for the marginal foreign green plant at volume K, or K-H (this is a fixed 
quantity, independent of s or g). The explanation for this equation is that, if import 
capacity is fully used by green electricity, generators will drive up the interconnection 
price until profits for the marginal generator are reduced to zero.  
 
  The  equilibrium  is  found  by  solving  both  equations  simultaneously.  To 
illustrate  the  solution,  as  an  example  let  us  make  the  assumption  that  demand  is 
completely inelastic, d(g) = d. We plot a qualitative picture of g and s as a function of 
d in Figure 3. For very small d (d << K), we may assume that there is sufficient green 
supply willing to produce for only the ¼0:KSURGXFHUVXEVLG\LHg = 0. Only 
low marginal cost domestic and foreign production will supply in this case. As qf(0,0) 
will be smaller than K – H, the interconnector will not be congested with green energy 
and s = 0; the price for interconnection capacity is therefore equal to the gray price   22 
difference pN - pG. Total imports will consist of H hydro power, qf(0,0) green non-
hydro energy and the rest (up to K) gray electricity.  
   
As d increases beyond qf(0,0), first g will increase to attract the more costly 
(non-hydro) green supply, again both from domestic and foreign producers. Since 
foreign production at zero g is insufficient to congest interconnection capacity with 
green power (H<K, by assumption, and also born out by evidence from the 2001 
situation), s will remain zero. This continues up to the point that qf(g,0) = K-H, when 
the  interconnector  gets  congested  with  green  energy  and  the  interconnector  price 
mark-up s becomes positive. In the next phase both g and s continue growing, subject 
to qf(g,s) remaining constant at K-H, or s = g + 20 - e(K-H), and qd(g) equaling d –
 K - H. This phase ends when s hits 20 and hydro energy is getting more and more 
displaced by green energy at increasing g, until g reaches the value where qf(g,20) = K 
and all hydro energy is displaced. From then on we are in the final phase where g and 
s again keep increasing subject to qf(g,s) = K, or s = g + 20 -e(K) and qd(g) = d - K. 
The sequence of events is summarized in Table 6. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Connection to observations 
 
In 2001, we effectively had g = 0 for foreign production: green certificates 
were only awarded to foreign production as of 2002. As Figure 2 shows, in the first 
half of the year, the interconnector prices were below arbitrage values, while, in the 
second  half  of  the  year,  these  prices  were  higher,  but  they  still  did  not  reveal  a 
significant mark-up on arbitrage values. Total green imports (7.6 TWh in total or, on 
average 868 MWh/h) were insufficient to congest the interconnector. On the other 
hand, in the second half of 2002 the interconnector was congested, at a mark-up s of 
somewhat over  ¼ 0:K *UHHQFHUWLILFDWH SULFHVDW WKH VDPH WLPH ZHUHDURXQG ¼
10/MWh. We can conclude that, at that time, we were in the regime of congestion by 
both  hydro  and  non-hydro  green  energy,  as  is  borne  out  by  the  statistics  of 
Groencertificatenbeheer. Under the assumption of inelastic demand, we can estimate 
from (6) the marginal excess production costs e(K-H) at circa ¼0:K1RWHWKDW  23 
according to Table 3, total green imports in 2002 were 8.15 TWh or 930 MWh/h, 
hence, in effect not much larger than the imports that CBS reported for 2001. As 
explained above, and as borne out by the CBS data for 2002 that became available 
very recently, in 2002, green certificate data understate the imported hydro energy and 
total green imports considerably; as a result the interconnectors were more congested 
than indicated by Table 3.  
 
Who benefited from the green policy? 
 
We next turn to an estimate of the cost of the Dutch green electricity subsidy 
scheme during 2002 and study what players have benefited from this scheme. 
 
  Recall that at the end of 2002, 1.4 million Dutch households had signed up for 
green electricity and that the average household consumes 3.2 MWh of electricity per 
year. If we estimate annual demand of green energy at 4.5 TWh (which coincides with 
the  estimate  provided  in  CBS  (2003)  and  which  more  or  less  coincides  with  the 
number of redeemed green certificates as of January 2003), and value all consumer 
subsidies at ¼0:KWKHYDOXHIRUGHOLYHU\WRVPDOOFRQVXPHUVZHFDQFRQFOXGH
that  ¼  PLOOLRQ ZDV VSHQW RQ WKH GHPDQG VLGH VXEVLGLHV ¼ 0:K WLPHV WRWDO
consumption  of  4.5  TWh).  From  Table  1,  we  can  conclude  that  the  supply  side 
subsidies amounted to slightly more, ¼PLOOLRQ¼0:KWLPHVWRWDOSURGXFWLRQ
of 14 TWh), hence, the total subsidy is ¼PLOOLRQ:KHUHGRHVWKLVPRQH\HQGXS" 
 
  The  producers  can  claim  the  producer  subsidies.  Domestic  producers  can 
claim this subsidy in full; after all they do not need the cooperation of another party. 
Table 1 allows us to conclude that this amount is approximately  ¼  PLOOLRQ ,Q
order to access the subsidies, green electricity producers from abroad have to pay 
increased  prices  for  interconnector  capacity.  A  rough  estimate  is  that  the 
interconnector price is ¼0:KKLJKHUWKDQ it otherwise would be. At total imports 
of 10.35 TWh, this amounts to increased auction revenue of  ¼PLOOLRQZKLFK
(by the rules governing the auction) is shared equally between TenneT and the auction 
organizers  (RWE-Netz  and  Eon-Netz)  on  the  German  side.  With  total  production 
subsidies for foreign production of ¼PLOOLRQWKLVOHDYHV¼PLOOLRQIRUWKH
foreign producers, which we assume they can keep in full (hence, we assume that they   24 
do  not  have  to  share  with  Dutch  supply  companies;  in  other  words,  the  ¼ 
million is an upper bound for the amount received by foreign producers). 
 
  The  consumer  subsidies  are  divided  between  consumers,  producers  and 
suppliers.  During  2002,  consumers  benefited  only  a  little,  since,  despite  the  huge 
subsidies, the price for green electricity was only slightly less than the price for gray 
electricity. Retail price information from www.greenprices.com demonstrates that, at 
the moment, some new entrants do provide large discounts on green energy of ¼WR
40/MWh, however, prices of market leaders tend to be close to gray energy prices, 
and in 2002, new entrants only had a small market share. As we have seen, also 
producers benefit only marginally, as the price of a green certificate is rather small: 
between ¼10/MWh and ¼0:K+HQFHWKHPDMRUEHQHILFLDULHVRIWKHVFKHPHDUH
the  intermediary  supply  companies.  Given  that  supply  companies  receive  the 
remaining  ¼ -50/MWh a sensible estimate is that of the  ¼  PLOOLRQ WKDW LV DW
stake, circa ¼PLOOLRQHQds up with supply companies, while the remainder,  ¼
million, goes to producers. From the data that are publicly available, it is not possible 
to determine exactly how this latter amount is split between foreign and domestic 
producers. On the one hand, there is more supply from abroad, but on the other hand, 
for  marketing  purposes,  there  may  be  a  preference  for  green  electricity  that  is 
produced  within  the  Netherlands.  As  a  rough  estimate,  we  assume  an  equal  split 
between Dutch and foreign producers, hence ¼PLOOLRQHDFK'RPHVWLFSURGXFHUV
therefore receive, on aggregate,  ¼  PLOOLRQ SURGXFHU VXEVLGLHV DQG ¼  PLOOLRQ
from green certificates, leading to a total of  ¼  PLOOLRQ )RUIRUHLJQ SURGXFHUV
the resulting figure is ¼PLOOLRQ$OO in all, the balance is as in Table 7. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
  One may wonder why, given that green electricity consumers have free choice 
of supply company, there is not more competition between these companies and why 
consumers do not benefit from lower prices. Allegedly this is because the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs has put pressure on these companies not to lower their prices for 
green energy; see Financieel Dagblad (2001). From a public finance perspective, this 
would be understandable, after all each household that switches to green electricity 
costs the Dutch taxpayer ¼SHU\HDUEXWIURPDSXUHO\HFRQRPLFSRLQWRIYLHZ  25 




5 CONCLUSION: POLICY CHANGES 
 
  During 2001 and 2002, the Netherlands experimented with a liberal, mainly 
consumer-oriented policy to stimulate the greening of electricity. As the number of 
households switching to green energy rose from a very small base at the beginning of 
2001 to approximately 1.4 million at the end of 2002, this policy can be considered a 
major success. Remarkably, as of 2002, the policy also did not make a distinction 
between  domestic  production  and  electricity  generation  abroad:  a  certain  type  of 
electricity generation was eligible for a certain type of subsidy, irrespective of the 
location where that electricity was generated. The darker side of the coin is that the 
policy  was  rather  expensive;  indeed  to  reach  the  goal  of  9%  of  Dutch  electricity 
consumption  to  be  green,  the  2002  policy  mix  would  result  in  annual  costs  of 
approximately ¼PLOOLRQ7:KRIFRQVXPSWLRQVXEVLGL]HGDW¼0:K 
 
  A second shortcoming of the system is related to its effect on interconnection 
prices. As we have seen, in 2002, the policy induced a permanent green congestion of 
interconnectors between Dutch and German grids. The first consequence of this is that 
a substantial part of the subsidies for green energy (19%) ended up in the hands of 
interconnector owners, while the use of more efficient foreign production was limited 
to  the  amount  of  interconnection  capacity.  A  second  and  important  effect  of  the 
congestion is that it distorts the (much larger) market for gray electricity, since price 
responsive gray imports, which play a role in reducing market power of domestic 
generators,  are  displaced  by  inflexible  green  imports.  In  effect,  the  Dutch  green 
subsidies make it unattractive to import gray electricity from abroad, thus increasing 
the price of gray electricity in the Netherlands; see the Report by the Dutch Market 
Surveillance Committee (DTe, 2002). This is a second channel through which the 
Dutch producers have benefited from the green subsidy, a channel that has not been 
taken into account in Table 7. (As distribution companies own generating facilities, 
we note that this again benefited these distribution companies.) 
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In reaction to these problems, the Dutch government has chosen to adopt a 
completely  different  policy  as  of  July  2003.  The  essence  of  the  new  policy  is  to 
reduce the demand side subsidies and to increase the supply side subsidies, but to 
limit the latter to newly or recently installed domestic production. Generators of green 
electricity located within the Netherlands will, for a period of 10 years, receive a 
subsidy related to the difference in cost of their technology and the cost of producing 
gray  electricity,  where  technologies  that  are  not  much  more  costly  will  be 
compensated in full. Specifically, biomass will receive a subsidy of ¼0:KZLQG-
power on land will receive a subsidy of ¼0:KDQGRWKHUIRUPVRIJUHHQSRZHU 
including wind at sea, will receive the maximal subsidy of ¼0:K,QDGGLWLRQWKH
demand side subsidies for small scale consumers will be reduced to ¼0:KIURP
the ¼0:KWKDWLWZDVLQ1RWHWKHUHIRUHWKDWWKHPD[LPDOVXEVLG\WKDWZLOO
be available from July 2003 will be  ¼ 0:K ZKLFK LV  DERYH WKH PD[LPDO
subsidy that was available in 2002. 
 
Given  the  above  analysis,  it  does  make  sense  to  reduce  the  demand-side 
subsidies, as is planned. Furthermore, given that the intention is to increase production 
capacity,  it  does  make  sense  to  limit  the  subsidies  to  new  or  recently  installed 
capacity. However, the other parts of the plan, to limit the production subsidies to 
domestic generation and to differentiate these subsidies according to how inefficient 
these generating technologies are, are economically less efficient. No matter where 
electricity is produced from renewable resources and no matter which technology is 
used to produce it, the benefit to the environment is the same, hence, the subsidy 
should be the smallest amount that is necessary to reach the goal. 
 
Actually,  one  would  perhaps  expect  that  EU-regulations  would  prevent  a 
country from adopting policies that discriminate in favor of domestic firms. Quite 
interestingly, when the environment is concerned, this is not the case as the judgement 
of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  in  the  Preussen  Elektra  case  shows.  This  case 
concerns the high feed-in tariffs that German distribution companies have to pay to 
windmill  parks  that  are  connected  to  their  network.  Preussen  Elektra  objected  to 
having to pay at least 80% of the average sale price and started proceedings at the 
Landgericht Kiel, Germany. The Landgericht referred two important questions to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:   27 
(i)  Does these rules constitute State Aid, i.e. are the rules in conflict with Article 
92 of the EC Treaty? 
(ii)  Can these rules be interpreted as a quantitative restriction on imports, i.e. do 
they conflict with Article 30 of the EC Treaty? 
In both cases, surprisingly, the Court came to the conclusion that the answer was 
negative; see the paragraphs 54 ff. of the Court Decision for the arguments. 
 
The main argument that the Dutch government used to argue that subsidies 
should be limited to domestic generation was that considerable tax money was leaking 
abroad. The calculations  that we have done  in this paper show  the extent of this 
subsidy flow to foreign parties: approximately one third of subsidies ended up abroad. 
However,  the  allocation  of  subsidies  between  domestic  and  foreign  parties  is  not 
necessarily  relevant.  If  the  least  costly  way  is  to  subsidize  foreign  renewable 
electricity  production,  then  only  foreign  producers  should  be  subsidized.  The 
argument that the Netherlands cannot exclusively rely on imports and that we have to 
be self-supporting to a certain extent also is not convincing: the Dutch could sign 
long-term contracts with foreign producers, or they could construct dedicated capacity 
abroad. To a certain extent, such foreign production is actually desirable: it seems to 
be most efficient to construct windmills in those areas where there is (a) most wind 
and (b) few people; in that case, one also solves the NIMBY-problems: few people 
want to have large, modern windmill in their direct neighborhood. The policy that will 
be in place as of 2003 does not allow subsidies to be given for green capacity located 
abroad that is newly built and dedicated to the Dutch market, and as such the new 
policy is inefficient. 
 
It is true, on the other hand, that apparently a large part of the foreign green 
energy imports is obtained from sources that need hardly any subsidy to be profitable, 
and that are currently excluded from subsidy regimes abroad (mainly from large units 
co-firing biomass). By limiting the subsidies to newly installed capacity, however, 
also this problem would be eliminated, hence, this is not good argument for banning 
foreign production from the subsidies.  
 
More efficient solutions to the problems with the 2002 green policy regime 
would  anyhow  take  advantage  of  the  efficiency  gains  of  employing  the  complete   28 
internal market. Obviously the ideal solution would be a joint green certificate market 
for the Community, as this would succeed in allocating generation to those places 
where it is most efficient. Total tax credits for redeemed certificates could be adjusted 
over time as prices are revealed in certificate trade. 
 
In the meantime, a temporary solution that does resolve problems of the 2002 
regime while employing the benefits of imported green power might consist of: 
a)  reducing the amount of subsidy; 
b)  possibly limiting the types of eligible generation types to the recently installed 
ones, or to coincide with foreign subsidy policies; 
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Source  2001  2002 
 
Biomass 
      
 1,980,600 




          
117,280 




              
13,060 
           




825,420          
 










10,581,360      
 
13,976,700 
Table 1: Domestic green energy production and imports (in MWh) in the Netherlands 
in 2001 and 2002. Source: CBS (2002, 2003). We note that CBS remarks that of the 
imports in 2002, 60% was biomass and 40% hydropower.  31 
 
 









Table 2. Regulatory energy tax (REB) in 2002. 
   32 
 
Source  H-Dec  A-Dec  T-Dec  H-02  A-02  T-02 
 
Biomass 
       
267,240 
       
731,320 
              
998,560 








           
9,597 
       
502,207 
              
511,804 








              
796 
           
    -   
                    
796 
          
2,411 
 





         
87,458 
     
4,326 
                
91,784 
       
924,642 
 
      35,735 
 
960,377 
Total         
365,091 
     
1,237,853 
           
1,602,944 






Table 3: green certificates issued in 2002 in MWh, split in Home, Abroad and Total.   33 
 
 

























Table 4. Prices for green certificate for Nordic biomass energy. 
   34 
 
Year  RWE  E.On 
2001  10.90  10.50 
2002  17.75  18.35 
2003    6.75    6.90 
Table 5. Prices (¼0:KIRUFDSDFLW\ERXJKWLQWKH\HDUDXFWLRQIRUWKH
interconnections with the two German grids, RWE and E.On.   35 
 
 
g and s  What happens 
g=0, s=0  Low  marginal  cost  foreign  and 
domestic producers 
g>0, s=0  Also producers with costs higher than 
gray price start producing 
g>0, s>0  Foreign supply is sufficient to congest 
interconnection,  only  new  domestic 
supply can be attracted 
g>0, s=20  Non-hydro  foreign  supplies  start 
displacing hydro imports 
g>0, s>20  Only non-hydro imports are profitable 
Table 6: sequence of events as demand d increases.   36 
 
 
Destination  Market player  Amount (million ¼ 
Home  Producers  107.5 
  Supply Companies   200 
  Network Company     52 
Abroad  Producers  138.5 
  Network Companies     52 
Total  Dutch government  -550 










































   Figure 1: Interconnector prices in month auctions for 2002 in relation to the 
price difference pN - pG between the Dutch (APX) and German (EEX) market.   38 
 Figure 2: Interconnector prices in month auctions for 2001 in relation to the price 









































arbitrage value  39 
 
 





Figure 3: qualitative picture of green electricity supply q depending on green 
certificate price g . 




 s  g
20
Figure 4: qualitative behavior of green certificate price and interconnection mark-up 
as a function of green demand. 
 
 